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INTRODUCTION

The law of liquidated damages 1 in Montana is a maze in
which every junction leads to a blind alley. Only one case considering the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses truly remains "good law" in Montana; the others have been overruled,
withdrawn, or rendered irrelevant. The one good case, however,
may also lead to a blind alley.
This Comment examines the Montana Supreme Court's three
very different interpretations of liquidated damages in three lines
of cases. The first line of cases consists of a century of essentially
overruled case law generally interpreting a state statute according to its plain meaning. 2 The second line, still officially valid precedent, rests on a 2003 case that expressly rejected the plain
meaning of the statute, impliedly rejected the statute itself, overruled much of the previous century's case law, and presented an
3
entirely new test for enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.
The third line consists of a 2005 case - withdrawn for reasons
unrelated to liquidated damages - that ignored the court's newin-the-box 2003 test, and resurrected the statute through an anal1. A "liquidated damages" clause is included in a contract to stipulate, in advance,
how much a breaching party must pay a non-breaching party. Many types of contracts
contain liquidated damages clauses: a real estate buy-sell agreement may require a down
payment to be paid as damages if the buyer does not close the deal; a contract for the sale of
goods may stipulate what damages the seller must pay if the seller's breach damages the
buyer. See infra Section II.B. This Comment mainly discusses liquidated damages in contracts not covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, i.e., contracts not for the sale of goods.
Liquidated damages in goods contracts are governed by MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-718
(2005).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005). See, e.g., Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133
(Mont. Terr. 1868); Deuninck v. West Gallatin Irrigation Co., 28 Mont. 255, 72 P. 618
(1903); Clifton v. Willson, 47 Mont. 305, 132 P. 424 (1913); Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co. v.
Big Sky of Mont., Inc., 171 Mont. 268, 557 P.2d 1017 (1976); Weber v. Rivera, 255 Mont.
195, 841 P.2d 534 (1992). To call these a 'line" of cases is not to imply consistent treatment
of liquidated damages. Justice Nelson said of this line of cases:
[O]ur precedent has both required and completely ignored proof that damages be
of a type difficult to ascertain; it has relied on proof of actual damages to show
reasonableness and it has rejected proof of actual damages to show reasonableness; it has considered actual bargaining as only one factor to be considered and it
has held actual bargaining is required; finally, it has considered the penalty/liquidated damages issue as one that requires evidence and also one that is based on
contract interpretation.
Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 45, 318 Mont. 103, 45, 79 P.3d 250,
45 [hereinafter Klyap].
3. Klyap, 9%78-83 (Gray, C.J., dissenting in part); Amer. Music Co. v. Higbee, 2004
MT 349, 324 Mont. 348, 103 P.3d 518.
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ysis premised on a legal error.4 These unsatisfactory choices embody the unsettled law of liquidated damages in Montana and illustrate how Montana's statute-based contract law distorts basic
principles of contract law.5
Two colliding tectonic principles of law created the thrust
fault that is the law governing liquidated damages: the principle
of freedom of contract, and the principle that penalties will not be
enforced. Freedom of contract, bedrock of the private law of contracts, holds that a clause fixing damages should be enforced simply because the parties agreed to it. The prohibition of penalties
holds that a liquidated damages clause must be scrutinized carefully, regardless of the parties' agreement, because damages must
be used only to compensate, never used in terrorem to compel the
other party's full performance under the contract. 6 These two
principles have piled up against each other for centuries; 7 the collision has created a notoriously inconsistent area of law.8
Over the last century, the prohibition-of-penalties plate has
ebbed. The doctrine of unconscionability has gradually expanded
to cover areas traditionally protected by the ban on penalties, 9 and
modern merchants rely increasingly on liquidated damages
clauses to reduce the likelihood and costs of litigation. 10 Modern
courts are thus more likely than their predecessors to favor freedom of contract by enforcing parties' stipulated damages
clauses. 1 1
4. Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, L.L.C., 2005 MT 21W, 2005 Mont. Lexis 24 (Rice, J.,
Gray, C.J., & Leaphart, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Cole 1], withdrawnby 2005 MT 115, 327
Mont. 99, 113 P.3d 275.
5. See Scott J. Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, 67 MONT. L. REV. 31, 41[hereinafter Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!].
6. 3 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 301 (3d ed. 2004).
7. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 554 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858) ("[Jludges have been long and constantly complaining of the confusion and want of harmony in the decisions upon this subject.").
9. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 303.
10. W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv.L. REV. 529, 529 (1971); Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 633-34 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) ("Today the
law does not look with disfavor upon 'liquidated damages' provisions in contracts."); Walter
Motor Truck Co. v. State, 292 N.W.2d 321 (S.D. 1980); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6,
§ 12.18, at 303-04 (noting that liquidated damages clauses are increasingly enforced by
courts).
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Under the rule in effect in most jurisdictions from the earlyto mid nineteenth century until around the first part of the twentieth century, a liquidated damages clause was enforceable if (1)
the amount was a reasonable forecast of actual damages and (2)
the damages caused by the breach were very difficult to estimate
at the time the contract was formed. 12 This Comment refers to
these two elements as the reasonableness element and the difficult-to-estimate element. During this period, most jurisdictions
probably considered the reasonableness element primary. Under
the modern rule, a court looks only to the reasonableness element
to determine enforceability. The difficult-to-estimate element is
13
no longer a separate prong of the rule.
In Montana, liquidated damages - like much of contract law
- are governed not by the common law, but by statute. 14 Montana statutory contract law owes its existence to the Field Civil
5
Code, the 1865 volume of model statutes governing civil law.'
The state of New York commissioned the effort to codify the entire
body of civil common law; the commissioners were led by the inde16
fatigable David Dudley Field.
Montana's statute governing liquidated damages was taken
practically verbatim from the Field Civil Code. Field's statute was
intended to mimic the common law rule of the 1860s when he
wrote the Civil Code. But the statute mimicked only half of the
17
common law rule of its time - the difficult-to-estimate half.
Thus in Montana, the less important element was crystallized in
statute as the law of liquidated damages even as the common law
marginalized that element. The result has been increasing tension between Montana's rule for liquidated damages on one side,
12. Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932). See infra Section III.A. (discussing the history of the common law
rule).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). See infra Section III.A. for dis-

cussion of the prevailing common law rules.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005) (title: "When provision fixing liquidated damages valid"); Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitrationin Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV.
139, 146 (2005) [hereinafter Burnham, War Against Arbitration].
15. CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK §§ 830-31, at 254-55 (Proposed Draft 1865)
[hereinafter FIELD CIVIL CODE]. The Montana Legislature actually adopted California's enacted version of Field's Civil Code, but the liquidated damages section underwent only cosmetic changes. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 1670-1671 (Deering 1885).
16. FIELD CIVIL CODE (1865). Though technically authored by several commissioners,
Field is widely regarded as the Code's author. This Comment follows that convention and
refers to the document as Field's creation.
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005).
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and generally accepted commercial practice and the prevailing legal rule on the other.
Perhaps partly because of this tension, the Montana Supreme
Court in two recent cases enforced disputed liquidated damages
clauses without applying the plain meaning of the controlling statute. In a 2003 case, Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap,'8
the court overruled or rendered irrelevant practically all previous
liquidated damages case law, and enunciated an entirely new test
to determine the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, effectively supplanting the statute. 19 The Klyap majority held that
henceforth liquidated damages clauses will be presumed enforcea20
ble; only unconscionable clauses will be unenforceable.
Two years later, Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, L.L.C. (Cole I)
presented the Montana Supreme Court its next opportunity to
consider the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause. 2 1 In its
discussion of the statute, the court failed to mention that Klyap
had effectively nullified the statute. Instead of applying the Klyap
unconscionability test, the Cole I majority held that the parties
waived the liquidated damages statute. 22 The Cole I court's
waiver analysis utilized one of the highly generalized statutory
"maxims of jurisprudence," but was based on the faulty premise
that the law of liquidated damages is a default rule (one that parties may contract around), rather than a mandatory rule (one that
parties may not contract around). 23 The court's confusion over
mandatory versus default rules makes the waiver maxim particularly dangerous.
On rehearing the case, the court withdrew Cole I and, because
the earlier opinion applied the wrong standard of review to the
trial judge's findings, issued a superseding opinion (Cole II).24 Because Cole If bypassed liquidated damages entirely, questions
raised by the court's Cole I analysis remain afloat, even after the
first opinion was scuttled.
18. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250.
19. Id.
20. Id. 1 48, 50. See Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 45-46
(discussing liquidated damages and Klyap).
21. Cole I, 2005 MT 21W, 2005 Mont. Lexis 24.
22. Id.
37.
23. Id. See Jason Scott Johnson, Default Rules/MandatoryPrinciples:A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the ContractModification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 337, 337-38 (1993).
24. 2005 MT 115, 2, 327 Mont. 99, 2, 113 P.3d 275, 2 [hereinafter Cole II].
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Montana's liquidated damages statute is a faulty enunciation
of a common law rule that is itself now obsolete. This Comment
argues that the Montana Supreme Court's treatment of liquidated
damages illustrates the unsettled nature of Montana's liquidated
damages law, the negative influence of the Field Civil Code on
Montana's contracts jurisprudence, and the dangers of confusing
default and mandatory rules.
Section II of this Comment discusses the Field Civil Code and
the history and underlying principles of the law of liquidated damages. Section III considers the rules governing liquidated damages under the common law and under Montana's statutory regime. Section IV discusses Klyap and the unconscionability test.
Section V discusses Cole I, its waiver analysis, and Cole 11, the
superseding opinion. Section VI discusses the lessons to be
learned from the case law. Section VII concludes.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Field Civil Code

The Field Civil Code became part of Montana law courtesy of
renowned New York City attorney David Dudley Field. Field led
the determined and vociferous nineteenth century movement of
philosophers, lawyers, judges, and business interests to displace
the common law with legal codes. 2 5 Advocates won an early victory in New York, where the legislature enlisted a commission
headed by Field to codify all aspects of the common law. 26
Field compiled his six model code volumes - Code of Civil
Procedure, Book of Forms, Code of Criminal Procedure, Political
Code, Penal Code, and Civil Code - over the course of almost
twenty years. 27 The New York Legislature enacted the Code of
Civil Procedure in 1848, but as the later codes were reported to
the Legislature - the last in 1865 -, codification's momentum in
25. Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 355, 35556 (1999) [hereinafter Morriss, Codification and Right Answers].
26. Andrew P. Morriss, Scott J. Burnham, & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil
Code 105 Years Late, 61 MONT. L. REV. 371, 373 (2000) [hereinafter Morriss et al., Debating
the Field Civil Code].
27. FIELD CmL CODE xii (1865); Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty
of Laws" - Lessons from One HundredYears of Codificationin Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV.
359, 367-68 (1995) [hereinafter Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws].
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New York had slowed. 28 The Civil Code, Field's most revolutionary and ambitious code, intended to supplant the civil common
law entirely, was never enacted in New York. 29 The ground
proved more fertile in the American West, where Territorial law,
changing jurisdictions, and foreign influences created a legislative
and legal hodgepodge. 30 First the Dakota Territorial Legislature
enacted the Civil Code in 1866. 3 1 Then in 1872, the California
Legislature enacted slightly modified versions of four of Field's
codes: Civil Procedure, Penal, Political, and, most importantly for
this discussion, the 1865 Civil Code. 32 The Montana Legislature
enacted the California version of the four codes practically verba33
tim in 1895.

Although much of the other three codes enacted in Montana
have been repealed or superseded, many Civil Code sections remain unchanged. 34 When enacted, the code sections formed a logically ordered block, but now they are littered throughout the articles of the Montana Code Annotated. 35 One hundred fifty-two of
the remaining Montana Field Civil Code statutes address the law
of contracts. 36
B. Liquidated Damages: Principlesand History
The law governing contract payments or obligations before
breach differs qualitatively from the law governing payments or
obligations after breach. While contract law grants parties great
latitude to negotiate substantive duties or payments under a contract, in keeping with its primary role to facilitate exchange relationships and commerce, 37 the law severely restricts parties'
28. Field had better luck in New York in the 1880s: The Penal Code was enacted in
1881, and parts of the Political Code were enacted throughout the 1880s. Morriss, "This
State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws," supra note 27, at 367-68.
29. Id. at 369-70.
30. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, supra note 25, at 362-63, 367.
31. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws," supra note 27, at 373-74.
32. Id. at 362-63.
33. Id.; Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, supra note 25, at 367.
34. See, e.g., MoNT. R. Civ. P. (replacing Field's CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE in Montana);
Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 32-33, 35.
35. Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 32 ("[S]ome 766 Field Code
provisions are scattered throughout the Montana Code Annotated .
36. Id. at 35.
37. 3 FARNswORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 300 n.1 ("Absent legislation, parties' power
over substantive rights and duties is subject only to the restraints imposed by public policy
and unconscionability.") (internal cross references omitted); Burnham, War Against Arbitration, supra note 14, at 139.
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choice of remedies. 38 The adages of consideration indicate the primacy of freedom of contract before breach: "the law will not enter
into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration"; 39 "[a]
rose, a hawk, or a peppercorn will suffice provided it is what is
40
asked for by the promisor."
While contract law tends not to poke its nose into the quantity
of the contract's consideration, the law meddles a great deal in
parties' choice of remedies. This meddling into stipulated remedies limits parties' freedom of contract and constitutes the law of
liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages clauses save time and money if a contract is breached. The non-breaching party avoids the nearly inevitable expense, time, and difficulty of proving the amount of
damages in court to a reasonable certainty. 4 1 If the contract contains an enforceable liquidated damages clause, the non-breaching party will probably be granted summary judgment on the
question of damages. 4 2 The non-breaching party must prove only
breach and causation, often a simpler matter. A liquidated damages clause will also allow a non-breaching party to receive compensation for damages that a court would be unlikely to recognize
43
or value accurately, such as the value of lost opportunities.
The breaching party may benefit by a liquidated damages
clause as well. Knowing the precise damages it will be required to
pay, the breaching party can accurately calculate the costs and
benefits of breaching the contract and allocate its resources to
more productive pursuits. Both parties save time and legal fees as
a result of the self-policing aspect of a liquidated damages
44
clause.
The law of liquidated damages asks if stipulated damages are
actually a penalty intended to coerce performance or punish
breach. The origin of the principle prohibiting penalties lies not in
the canon of contracts law, but in the courts of equity to protect
38. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
(1935) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES].

THE LAW OF DAMAGES §

147, at 600-601

39. Westlake v. Adams, (1858) 141 Eng. Rep. 99, 106 (C.P.) (Byles, J.).

40. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 115 (rev. ed. 1936).
41. 11 JOSEPH PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 58.1, at 395 (rev. ed. 2005) [hereinafter
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS].

42. Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 46.
43. Id.
44. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 301.
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against fraud and against penal bonds.45 In addition, the prohibition of penalties protects overly optimistic parties from their confidence that they can surely perform a contract and avoid an obvi46
ous penalty.
Some legal historians consider the prohibition of penalties
one of the earliest equitable interventions to the law, tracing its
origins to the fifteenth century, if not before. 47 About the prohibition of penalties in English law, Holdsworth wrote:
It was obviously against conscience that a person should recover a
sum of money wholly in excess of any loss incurred. A person seeking to do so might in some circumstances come perilously near to
committing a fraud, and in other circumstances might be unconscientiously seeking to take advantage of an accident.... But as yet
the limits of and the principles upon
which [equitable relief from
48
penalties] is exercised are vague.

Generally a clause that is held by the court to be a penalty
does not infect the entire contract; the penalty is simply excised
from the contract. 49 The prohibition of penalties occurs mainly in
common law countries; courts in civil law countries such as France
and Germany consider penalty clauses enforceable, just like any
other bargained-for contract term, although a judge may possess
more discretion to modify the stipulated damages term than to
modify other substantive terms of the contract.50
45. Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 554; McCoRMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 147,
at 601 (explaining that unscrupulous use of penal bonds to compel contract performance
was the impetus and foundation for the general prohibition of contract penalties).
46. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 147, at 601 ("It is a characteristic of
men, however, that they are likely to be beguiled by the 'illusions of hope,' and to feel so
certain of their ability to carry out their engagements in future, that their confidence leads
them to be willing to make extravagant promises and commitments as to what they are
willing to suffer if they fail."); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the
Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL.INTERDISc. L.J. 1, 29 (2002).
47. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 147, at 601; William H. Loyd, Penalties
and Forfeitures, 29 HARv. L. REV. 117, 120-24 (1915). But see 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6,
§ 12.18, at 302 (claiming that the principle prohibiting penalties had become settled "by the
latter part of the seventeenth century"); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428,
1440 (claiming that English courts adjudicating bonds sought to distinguish between penalties and liquidated damages from "the beginning of the eighteenth century").

48. 5 W.S.

HOLDSWORTH,

A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

293 (1924 ed.) (quoted in part in

Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contractand Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 495,

503 n.26 (1962)).
49. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.4, at 413.
50. Id.; 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 302, 302 n.5; Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1995).
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Some scholars regard the prohibition of penalties as a relic of
pre-industrial law that hinders efficient allocation of resources. 5 1
Law and economics scholars such as Judge Richard Posner and
Professor Richard Epstein reject the assumptions underlying An52
glo American law's strict separation of damages and penalty.
Others claim that the prohibition of penalties promotes economic
maximization. 5 3 Expectation damages - and thus also the prohibition of penalties - is often touted as an element of the doctrine
of efficient breach, 54 which holds that a party should be free to
breach a contract in pursuit of greater gains, provided that the
breaching party compensates the non-breaching party for its
losses (measured by the non-breaching party's expectancy interest).5 5 When the law promotes efficient breach, a party may reallocate its resources from a less profitable contracted use to a more
profitable one, without penalty. Efficient breach thus enhances
51. XCO Int'l, Inc. v. Pac. Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004); Goetz &
Scott, supra note 7, at 556, 556 n.12.
The explanation for the rule against penalty clauses may be purely historicaland "it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV." The slow pace at which the common law
changes makes it inevitable that some common law rules will be vestigial, even
fossilized.
XCO Int'l, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1002 (Posner, J.) (citation omitted) (quoting 0. W. Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
52. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J.) ("[Like every other state, Illinois, untroubled by academic skepticism of the
wisdom of refusing to enforce penalty clauses against sophisticated promisors continues
steadfastly to insist on the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages.") (citations omitted); XCO Int'l, Inc., 369 F.3d 998 (Posner, J.); Richard A. Epstein, Contracts
Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-Faire,in THE FALL
AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25, 56-57 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Ugo Mattei, supra
note 50, at 431; Scott & Triantis, supra note 47, at 1432-33; 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,
supra note 41, § 58.4, at 416 ("Some courts have doubted the soundness of the [liquidated
damages] policy that sustained any such limitation [on freedom of contract] at all.").
53. Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351, 352. Contrasupra note 52 (a
near consensus of law and economics scholars argue that traditional formulations of liquidated damages impede economically efficient contract relations).
54. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 47, at 1446.
55. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is considered an originator of the doctrine of
efficient breach:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes
the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every
case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by,
and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.
0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881) (quoted in Epstein, supra note 52, at 55).
Epstein described efficient breach as an "offshoot of the famous Holmes dictum." Epstein,
supra note 52, at 56.
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economic efficiency and maximizes societal gain (or so the theory
56
holds).
The law governing liquidated damages is a facet of the prohibition of penalties. If unenforceable liquidated damages are simply penalties, why is a separate doctrine necessary? Although
perhaps redundant, separate enumeration of the doctrines of penalty and liquidated damages may have closed a loophole allowing
penalties if the parties called them "liquidated damages." In a
comment appended to the liquidated damages code section, Field
wrote: "The use of the phrase 'liquidated damages' leads frequently to an evasion of the law in respect to penalties."5 7 An
early nineteenth century New York case illustrates courts' focus
on the parties' language to determine intent and enforceability: "It
may be said that when the sum specified in the contract is described by the parties as liquidated damages [and the proportionate and certainty requirements are met], the language will be
deemed expressive of the intent of the parties, and the specified
58
sum will not be treated as a penalty."

56. Most, if not all, modern law and economics scholars criticize the economic justifications for efficient breach doctrine, and the doctrine itself:
The wheels of commerce work best when social pressures support the faithful performance of promises with a minimum of legal compulsion and interference....
The rule [of efficient breach] also allows promisors to be the arbiter of when they
perform and when they pay, sharply contrary to the global expectations in standard commercial transactions. Theory aside, contract damages, as administered,
often fail to bring the plaintiff to the position he would have enjoyed if the transaction were completed.
[Efficient breach] also allocates all the gains from breach to the party in breach
....
[and] encourages individuals to profit from their own wrong.
Epstein, supra note 52, at 57.
57. FIELD CIVIL CODE § 83 cmt., at 255 (1865). Field added commentary to each Civil
Code section, but these comments are generally not included in states' enacted versions of
the Civil Code.
58. Smith v. Smith, 4 Wend. 468, 468 note a (N.Y. 1830) (discussing liquidated damages in the context of penal bonds). See also Gainesford v. Griffith, (1679) 85 Eng. Rep. 59,
65 note 1(d) (K.B.):
[W]henever the sum mentioned in any instrument must, from the express language of the instrument....
be considered as the ascertained or liquidated damages agreed to be paid by one party to the other on the.., performance or omission
of a particular act, the statute [prohibiting penalties] will not apply; for in such
case the sum is not a penal sum; and Courts of Equity will not relieve against such
sum, although they will against a penalty.
Id. (emphasis added).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2006

11

372

Montana
Law Review, Vol.
67 [2006],
Iss. 2, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 67

The "fuzzy line between penalty clauses and liquidated-damages clauses" 5 9 has shifted in favor of freedom of contract since
Field's day. Common law jurisdictions are much more likely to
allow freedom of contract and enforce liquidated damages clauses,
but the prohibition of penalties still lives. Like all restrictions on
freedom of contract, the limitation on parties' ability to stipulate
damages results from "notions of public policy."60 All rules that
limit freedom of contract are mandatory rules, including the rules
61
governing liquidated damages.
C. Default Rules and Mandatory Rules
The rules that make up contract law can be divided into two
categories: default rules and mandatory rules.6 2 Default rules are
inserted into a contract only when the parties fail to stipulate the
63
relevant term; parties are free to contract around the rule.
Mandatory rules, on the other hand, derive from public policy concerns and must be followed regardless of the parties' desire to de64
viate from them.
Default rules arise from a need to streamline commercial
transactions, "both to reduce the costs of forming contracts in the
first place and to eliminate uncertainty in contract disputes after
the fact."6 5 A court applies a default rule in three steps: first, the
court determines that the contract lacks a term that would settle
the dispute; second, the court identifies the appropriate default
rule from the law of contracts; and third, the court imputes the
default rule to the disputed contract. As long as the parties include a particular term in their contract, they may waive a default
rule. Most contract rules are default. 66 For example, the rules
59. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,

J.).
60. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.2, at 399.
61. Scott & Triantis, supra note 47, at 1444-45.
62. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 748 (1999); Burnham, War Against Arbitration,supra
note 14, at 141. Professor Burnham describes the rules as being either "facilitatory" or
"regulatory" rather than default or mandatory.
63. Ware, supra note 62, at 748.
64. Burnham argues that in an ideal contract law, statutes would govern mandatory
rules and the common law would govern default rules. Burnham argues that Montana's
corpus of Field Code statutory contract law confuses what is a mandatory and what is a
default contract rule. Burnham, War Against Arbitration,supra note 14, at 144-47.
65. Epstein, supra note 52, at 28.
66. F.H. Buckley, Introduction,in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

1, 7-8

(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
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governing the timing of parties' performance under a contract are
67
default rules.
The ultimate overarching default rule is reasonableness. If
no specific default rule exists to resolve an eventuality outside the
parties' contract, the Second Restatement section 204 describes
the operation of the ultimate default rule: "When the parties to a
bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with
respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their
rights and duties, [then] a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."68 Default contract rules are
based upon what is reasonable; reasonable in turn is usually de69
termined by common or commercial practice.
Parties cannot contract around a mandatory rule. For example, parties may not stipulate that one party will not be bound by
70 Ancontract law's requirement of good faith and fair dealing.
other example of a mandatory rule is the statute of frauds, which
requires certain agreements to be in writing. 7 1 Parties cannot bypass the rule by agreeing that their oral contract falling under the
statute of frauds will be enforceable. The statute of frauds bars
enforcement of certain contracts regardless of the parties' intent.
Any contract rule (such as the those governing liquidated
damages) that voids a contract term that fails a particular test
must be mandatory. If the law renders a contract term void or
unenforceable, then the parties are obviously not free to contract
around the rule; the invalidated clause memorialized the parties'
72
unsuccessful attempt to contract around the rule.
Mandatory rules restrict freedom of contract and come in two
varieties. The first variety restricts parties from entering a particular kind of agreement at all. For example, contracts entered
into for illegal objects are void as a matter of law, and many jurisdictions commonly forbade all commercial activities on Sundays. 7 3
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 233 (1981) ("Where only a part of
one party's performance is due at one time ... if the other party's performance can be so
apportioned that there is a comparable part that can also be rendered at that time, it is due
at that time, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.").
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
69. Burnham, War Against Arbitration,supra note 14, at 139.
70. Johnson, supra note 23, at 388.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
72. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 609 (2003). ("Mandatory contract law rules ban terms that parties
choose; hence, these rules are inconsistent with the commitment to party sovereignty.").
73. 15 GRACE McLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 79.5, 82.1 (Joseph Perillo, ed.
2003) [hereinafter GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS]. See also, ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
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The second and most common variety of mandatory rule may allow parties to agree to a contract term but restricts its judicial
enforcement. 74 The statute of frauds illustrates this second type
of mandatory rule. Parties may freely enter oral agreements for
the sale of real estate, for example, but the law prevents judicial
75
enforcement of the agreement.
These two varieties of mandatory rules illustrate the dual nature of freedom of contract.7 6 One element of freedom of contract
is the ability to freely agree to terms; the second element is the
judicial power to enforce the terms. 7 7 Mandatory rules that impinge upon the first type of contract are universally based on public policy, because freedom of contract is completely curtailed. 78
Mandatory rules of the second type, however, may be based on a
mix of public policy and commercial practice.7 9 A contract rule
setting boundaries outside of which provisions will not be enforced
must set those boundaries based on the intersection of public policy and accepted practice. The law of liquidated damages balances
those interests, and the boundary has changed as common accepted practice has changed.
Liquidated damages is a mandatory rule of the second variety
because parties may enter an agreement stipulating excessive
damages, but courts will refuse to enforce that term. Compare liquidated damages to the statute of frauds, an emblematic
mandatory rule. Under the statute of frauds, oral contracts for
the sale of real property are generally unenforceable.8 0 The statute of frauds operates in the following steps in an agreement to
sell land: (1) The parties enter an oral contract for the purchase of
land; (2) one party refuses to perform the contract; (3) the other
party petitions the court to enforce the contract; (4) the court looks
to the contract and determines that it falls under the statute of
frauds, and must therefore be evidenced by a writing; and (5) beCORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1377 (1962 ed.) (section title: "A Bargain May be Unenforceable
without Being Illegal"); SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT: A TREATISE ON
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND 9, 287 (8th ed. 1911) ("An agreement or other act which is void has from the beginning no legal effect at all.").
74. Macneil, supra note 48, at 495.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
76. Macneil, supra note 48, at 495.
77. Id.; 15 GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 73, § 79.4, at 20-21.
78. 15 GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 73, § 79.4, at 20-21.

79. Mattei, supra note 50, at 430 ("Freedom of contract can be limited in many ways,
some of which are compatible or mandated by the efficiency criterion.").
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
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cause the term does not fall under one of the statute's exceptions,
8
the contract is deemed unenforceable. '
Analogous steps apply in the operation of liquidated damages
law: (1) the parties enter a contract that includes a liquidated
damages clause bordering on a penalty; (2) one party breaches and
refuses to pay the damages defined by the contract; (3) the nonbreaching party petitions a court to enforce the clause; (4) the
court looks to the clause and determines that it is a liquidated
damages clause (regardless of how the parties name it); and (5)
because the clause fails certain requirements - for example the
reasonableness requirement and the difficult-to-estimate requirement -, the clause is deemed unenforceable. Liquidated dam82
ages rules are always mandatory.
III.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND
UNDER MONTANA'S STATUTORY REGIME

A.

The Common Law Rule

Historically, the common law considered three inquiries to determine whether a clause is an allowed liquidated damages clause
or a prohibited penalty: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) the difficulty of estimating or proving damages; and (3) whether the
83
amount stipulated is a reasonable forecast of probable damages.
The salience of each element has fluctuated during the history of
liquidated damages law, but over time, the dispositive question
has shifted from intention to reasonableness.
Treatises and liquidated damages case law indicate three doctrinal periods (two major periods sandwiching one minor period).,4 In the early phase, courts focused mainly on the intentions of the parties - often determined by the language of the
contract - and enforced liquidated damages clauses somewhat
liberally.8 5
81. Id.
82. See infra Section V.C. for further discussion of default and mandatory rules.
83. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.5, at 419; 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note
6, § 12.8, at 305. The reasonableness test normally looks forward to what would be reasonable damages at the time of formation rather than at the time of breach.
84. But see 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.4, at 413 (dividing the historical case law and doctrinal periods differently).

85. Scott & Triantis, supra note 47, at 1443;

MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES,

supra note 38,

§149, at 606 ("Formerly the validity of agreements was said to depend on whether the
intention of the parties was to agree on liquidated damages or to fix a penalty [but] [t]his
gave too great decisiveness to the descriptive items used in the contract."). See, e.g.,
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The middle transitional phase may have been more of a doctrinal cul-de-sac than a phase, characterized by hostility toward
liquidated damages clauses. Courts showed their hostility by applying strict tests rather than principles in order to block liquidated damages claims; the intention of the parties was no longer
dispositive.8 6 During this phase courts looked at the reasonableness of the damages, but sometimes focused on whether damages
87
were difficult to estimate at the time the contract was formed.
David Dudley Field was one highly influential writer who focused
on the difficulty of estimating damages, even then the least important element of liquidated damages law. Thus Montana law was
frozen in a doctrinal dead-end. In his venerable treatise on damages, Charles T. McCormick debunked the difficult-to-estimate element and described how it became the dispositive question in
some states:
This supposed requirement of uncertainty of actual damages which
in practice has little importance in the other states unfortunately
was crystallized in statutory form in California in 1872 (reflecting
the tendency then prevailing to frown upon liquidated damages)
....

This legislation has been embodied also in the Codes of other

Western States [including Montana's].88
Gainesford v. Griffith, (1679) 85 Eng. Rep. 59, 65-66 note 1(d) (K.B.) ("The law, nevertheless, remains unshaken, that parties may, by their mutual agreement, settle the amount of
damages, uncertain in their nature, in respect of the performance or omission of a particular specified act, at any sum upon which they may agree; and such sum may be recovered
as liquidated damages."); Smith v. Smith, 4 Wend. 468, 468 note a (N.Y. 1830) ("One of the
rules ... is, that where it is agreed that if a party do a particular thing a stipulated sum
shall be paid by him, there the sum stated may be treated as liquidated damages."); Bagley
v. Peddie, 16 N.Y. 469, 471-72 (Ct. App. 1857) (Shankland, J.) ("The effort of the court is to
learn the intent of the parties."). In other early cases, however, courts did not defer to the
parties' language. See, e.g., Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858) ("The court will ...
disregard the express stipulation of the parties, only [when] the principle of compensation
has been disregarded ....

[but] the real question [is] not what the parties intended, but

whether the sum is, in fact, in the nature of a penalty."); Lampman v. Cochran, 16 N.Y. 275,
278 (Ct. App. 1858) ("The parties ... must be regarded as having given a wrong name to
this sum of $500, and that it is in substance a penalty and not liquidated damages."); 11
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs, supra note 41, § 58.4, at 413.
86. See, e.g., FIELD CIVIL CODE § 831 cmt., at 255 (1865) ("The courts ... constantly
discourage [liquidated damages clauses]. They are oppressive and unconscientious, except
in the cases permitted above, and ought not to be allowed."); Justin Sweet, Liquidated
Damages in California, 64 CAL. L. REV. 84, 142 (1972); 11 CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTS, supra
note 41, § 58.4, at 413.
87. See, e.g., Nilson v. Jonesboro, 20 S.W. 1093, 1094 (Ark. 1893); City of Indianola v.
Gulf, W. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 56 Tex. 594, 1882 WL 9435, *8 (1882); Pierce v. Jung, 10 Wis.
30, 1859 WL 2868 *2 (1859).
88. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 148, at 606 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 1670, 1671 (Deering 1872); MONT. REV. CODE §§ 5054, 5055 (1907); OKLA. REV. LAws
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In the third phase, prevailing today, courts look primarily, or
perhaps entirely, to the third doctrinal question: the reasonableness of the stipulated damages.8 9 Courts still consider the difficulty of estimating damages, but only in relation to the reasonableness of the amount stipulated, not as a separate threshold
question. The first doctrinal question - the parties' intent - is
usually no longer even considered relevant. 90 In the third phase,
strict rules are abandoned; reasonableness is the guiding principle
rather than some black letter rule. 9 1
The middle phase common law rule prevalent in 1895, when
the Montana Legislature enacted Montana's liquidated damages
statute, was restated in 1932 by the American Law Institute in
section 339 of its Restatement of Contracts (FirstRestatement):
Liquidated Damages and Penalties.
(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages
therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the
damages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapa92
ble or very difficult of accurate estimation.

Under the First Restatement rule quoted above, liquidated damages clauses were presumed unenforceable unless two separate
requirements were satisfied: the reasonableness requirement of
§ 975, 976 (1910); N.D. COMP. LAWS
§§ 1274, 1275 (1913)).

§§

5925, 5926 (1913); S.D. COMP. LAWS, CIv. CODE

89. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 149, at 606. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra

note 6, § 12.18, at 308-09 n.26 for discussion ofjurisdictions that presume liquidated damages clauses unenforceable and jurisdictions that presume them enforceable. The central
inquiry in the modern rule - the reasonableness requirement - was considered by certain
courts since at least the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., Smith, 4 Wend. at 468 n.a ("If
the amount [of stipulated damages] is excessive and unreasonable, the parties are relieved
from their own improvidence, the sum is treated as a nominal penalty."); Williams v. Dakin
& Bacon, 22 Wend. 201, 211 (N.Y. Ct. of Error 1839) ("[Where the intent of the parties is
unclear], the courts have taken the reasonableness of the provision as liquidated damages
into consideration, for the purpose of determining whether the [the stipulated damages
clause was intended as a penalty].").
90. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 313 ("[Courts' consideration of parties' intent in a damages clause is] fast disappearing, and there is no good reason why a stipulation should not be upheld as one for liquidated damages even though its purpose may have
been compulsion."); 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.5, at 419; Clarkson,
Miller & Muris, supra note 53, at 353.
91. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.4, at 413.
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932); see also, e.g., Wise v. United States, 249
U.S. 361, 365 (1919); New Britain v. New Britain Tel. Co., 50 A. 881, 884 (Conn. 1902);
Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914).
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subsection (a) and the difficult-to-estimate requirement of subsection (b).
The prevailing rule changed significantly after the First Restatement. Fifteen years later in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States cited the FirstRestatement,
but enunciated a more modern rule: "When [liquidated damages
clauses] are fair and reasonable attempts to fix just compensation
for anticipated loss caused by breach of contract, they are enforced." 93 The Court did not mention the difficult-to-estimate ele94
ment, although the sources cited by the Court include it.
The 1981 Second Restatement, section 356 reads:
Liquidated Damages and Penalties.
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of
the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. 95

The Second Restatement modern rule presumes liquidated damages clauses enforceable rather than unenforceable. Whereas the
FirstRestatement rule requires an enforceable liquidated damages
clause to pass a two-element test, the Second Restatement test has
only one element: the stipulated damages must reasonably approximate anticipated or actual loss. 9 6 The newer rule no longer
includes the FirstRestatement's requirement that the damages be
"very difficult of accurate estimation." The parties' intent, touchstone of the law during the first phase of liquidated damages law,
97
is no longer relevant.
Although no longer a separate element, the difficulty of determining damages has not disappeared entirely from the equation.
What had been the difficulty of estimating damages (FirstRestatement) became the difficulty of proving them (Second Restatement).
The difficult-to-estimate element became the difficult-to-prove factor. The difficult-to-prove factor was also subsumed by the reasonableness inquiry. Under the modern rule, the difficulty of
proof only affects the question of reasonableness; it is not a
threshold determination in its own right. The comments to the
93. Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947).
94. Id.

95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
96. Id. The Second Restatement's rule explicitly broadens the inquiry by applying principles rather than formal tests to determine enforceability.
97. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 313.
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Second Restatement describe how the difficult-to-prove factor affects reasonableness:
The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or
of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty, the easier it
is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.... If the difficulty of
proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof
of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that ap98
proximation.
In the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the difficult-to-prove
factor of the Second Restatement has shrunk even further. Although earlier UCC versions copied the Second Restatement's difficult-to-prove factor, the 2003 revision removes that factor entirely except when courts consider consumer contracts. The underlined portion of the new UCC section shows the new language
that further removes the difficult-to-prove factor from the consideration.
Damages .

.

. may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an

amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach and, in a consumer contract, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. 9 9
The law has grown increasingly tolerant of liquidated damages clauses for several reasons. 10 0 First, because of the proliferation of adhesion contracts, such clauses have become increasingly
widespread in modern commerce. 10 Merchants rely on contract
terms such as liquidated damages clauses to reduce the
probability or expense of litigation. Second, the emerging doctrine
of unconscionability - dormant or at least toothless at the genesis
of liquidated damages law - limits some of the abuses liquidated
damages law was designed to prevent (although a "not-unconscionable" measure of damages presents a substantially lower
hurdle to enforcing a damages term than does a "reasonable" mea02
sure of damages).
98.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356 cmt. b (1981) (cross references omit-

ted).

99. U.C.C. § 2-718(1), 1 U.L.A. 549 (2004).
100. Some theorists have argued that liquidated damages clauses should be enforceable,
subject only to the unconscionability doctrine. See supra Section II.B.; Dimatteo, supra
note 10, at 637 (discussed infra Section IV.B.); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 72, at 616-17.
101. Slawson, supra note 10, at 529; Dimatteo, supra note 10, at 633-34.
102. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 303 ("With the development of a doctrine of
unconscionability capable of coping with abusive stipulated damage provisions in the same
way as other abusive provision, however, it has become increasingly difficult to justify the
peculiar historical distinction between liquidated damages and penalties."). But see 11
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Third, the difficult-to-estimate requirement has long been
recognized as illogical and counterproductive. Scholars have argued that if damages are easy to estimate, then the parties' liquidated damages clause is more likely to be accurate, and contracting parties will be better able to determine if the clause is in
their interest.103 Requiring that damages be difficult to estimate
deprives many contracts of the benefit of a liquidated damages
clause. Scholars arguing this point claim that courts should be
more - not less - inclined to enforce liquidated damages clauses
when the damages were easy to determine at the time the contract
10 4
was formed.
B.

Montana's Statutory Regime

Montana's enactment of the Field Civil Code's liquidated
damages statute crystallized nineteenth century hostility to liquidated damages and deadened the law to changing commercial
practices. Penned by Field prior to 1865, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-721 provides:
When provision fixing liquidated damages valid.
(1) Every contract by which the amount of damage to be paid or
other compensation to be made for a breach of an obligation is determined in anticipation thereof is to that extent void, except as expressly provided in Subsecton WL.
(2) The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount
which shall be presumed to be an amount of damage sustained by a
be imbreach thereof when, from the nature of the case, it would
10 5
practicable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.

Why does Field's version lack the reasonableness element of
the common law rule, considered most important by most judges
and treatise writers? There are three possible explanations.
First, Field may have simply erred when he codified this particular rule of the common law; second, Field may have copied some
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.1, at 396 (arguing that unconscionability is a
foundation of the law of liquidated damages, rather than a doctrine rendering liquidated
damages law redundant).

103. See, e.g.,

MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES,

supra note 38, § 148, at 605 ("If the agreement

reasonably approximates the probable damages which a court would give, why forbid the
parties thus to agree, even if the damage could be readily and exactly foreseen?").
104. Id. § 148, at 603, 605.
105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005). The statute's use of the term "void" in the
statute is confusing. Generally, void contracts are illegal. Liquidated damages clause are
not illegal, but may be unenforceable. See 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.4,
412 ("Although penalties are unenforceable, they are not illegal ... ."); ARTHUR LINTON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1377 (1962 ed.) (section title: "A Bargain may be Unenforceable without Being Illegal").
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version of the common law rule of the early nineteenth century
that lacked an explicit reasonableness requirement; third, Field
may have intended that the reasonableness element in liquidated
damages would be addressed by the general reasonableness-ofdamages statute at section 1858 of the Civil Code 10 6 (identical to
Montana Code Annotated section 27-1-302).107
Montana courts have not invoked section 27-1-302 for the reasonableness requirement for liquidated damages.' 0 8 Instead,
Montana courts have imputed the reasonableness requirement to
the one-element, difficult-to-estimate liquidated damages statute.
In Morgen & Oswood Construction Co. v. Big Sky of Mont., Inc.,
the court borrowed the reasonableness element from an
Oklahoma case interpreting the identical Civil Code statute. 10 9
The Oklahoma case, in turn, also ignored its own Civil Code reasonableness-of-damages statute when it interpreted a reasonableness requirement into the same Civil Code liquidated damages
statute. 1 0 The Morgen & Oswood court also noted a law review
article that claimed that California courts imputed a reasonableness test into its Field Civil Code one-element liquidated damages
statute rather than applying California's reasonableness-of-damages statute."'
106. FIELD CIVIL CODE § 1878, at 581 (1865).
107. "Damages to be reasonable. Damages must in all cases be reasonable, and
where an obligation of any kind appears to create a right to unconscionable and grossly
oppressive damages contrary to substantial justice, no more than reasonable damages can
be recovered." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-302 (2005).
108. Perhaps Montana courts and practitioners have not recognized section 27-1-302 as
a component of liquidated damages because the title of section 28-2-721 contains the
phrase "liquidated damages." Having found the appropriately titled statute, one might be
tempted to call off the search for an applicable statute. Any logical ordering of code sections is liable to become jumbled in the process of enactment and re-codification by state
legislatures. Professor Burnham wrote that common law rules "make sense only in the
context of the common law, not when ripped from that context [and codified]." Burnham,
Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 47.
109. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co. v. Big Sky of Mont., Inc., 171 Mont. 268, 272-273,
557 P.2d 1017, 1020 (quoting Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 769 (Okla. 1965)).
Oklahoma's liquidated damages statute also derives from the Field Civil Code and was
practically identical to Montana's statute. 15 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 215 (1961).
110. Waggoner, 408 P.2d at 769.
111. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 171 Mont. at 272-273, 557 P.2d at 1020 (citing Justin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 64 CAL. L. REV. 84, 131 (1972)). Professor
Sweet, describing a liquidated damages statute identical to Montana's, argued that California's "reasonable test" was different from the FirstRestatement's reasonableness test. California courts required that there be "reasonable endeavor to estimate actual damages."
Sweet, supra, at 142. This approach was adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in Weber
v. Rivera. Weber, 255 Mont. 195, 200, 841 P.2d 534, 537 (1992), abrogated by Klyap, 2003
MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250. Justice Nelson, in overruling Weber, pointed out that
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The codification of liquidated damages law caused the less important element to engulf the primary element, even as the diffi112
culty of estimating damages faded from the common law rule.
In his treatise on damages, McCormick noted the decreasing importance of the difficult-to-estimate requirement: "There seems to
be no real reason for imposing this limitation, in addition to the
requirement of reasonableness, upon the enforcement of agree"1 3
ments for liquidated damages.
By neglecting reasonableness, the primary element of liquidated damages, the Field Civil Code statute failed to accurately
codify the common law rule it was supposed to mimic. While the
common law adapts to changing commercial practice,'1 4 Field's
statute stands unchanged, cemented in place: a monument to outdated commercial norms. Modem norms and Field's aged rule collided in Klyap.
IV.

MONTANA CASE LAW: ARROWHEAD SCHOOL DISTRICT

NUMBER

A.

75 v.

KLYAP

1 15

Klyap

Until 2003, most confusion in Montana case law revolved
around ambiguities in the !anguage of t.hp liquidatp.d damages
statute. 1 16 In 2003, a majority of the Montana Supreme Court in
Klyap discussed the conflicting holdings in the body of liquidated
damages case law and then essentially overruled them all. In doing so, the court impliedly nullified section 28-2-721, the liqui17
dated damages statute."
the requirement that parties actually "endeavored" to determine damages further muddied
an already murky rule. Klyap, J 42.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981); 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,
supranote 41, § 58.1, at 398 ("Under both the traditional and newer formulations, the [reasonableness requirement] is generally determinative . . ").
113. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 38, § 148, at 603. See also XCO Int'l, Inc. v.
Pac. Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) ("[Elven if damages
wouldn't be difficult to determine after the fact, it is hard to see why the parties shouldn't
be allowed to substitute their own ex ante determination for the ex post determination of a
court."). Posner argued against the reasonableness requirement as well. Id.
114. Macneil, supra note 48, at 503 ("Thus the modern tendency of the law toward favoring liquidated damages clauses in doubtful cases is not at odds with the great increase in
legislative and judicial limitation on the power of contract.").
115. 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250.
116. See, e.g., Weber, 255 Mont. at 200, 841 P.2d at 537 (requiring evidence of actual
negotiation over a liquidated damages clause in order for it to be enforceable).
117. Klyap, 24 n.7. "According to the language of the [statute], liquidated damages are
only allowed in a situation where damages are impractical [sic] or extremely difficult to
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Klyap concerned an employment contract that required a
teacher to pay damages to his school district employer if he
breached his contract by quitting before the end of the contract
term. 118 The teacher (Klyap) breached the contract. After deciding that the clause was indeed a liquidated damages clause, the
Montana Supreme Court banished the controlling statute - section 28-2-721 - to a footnote. 119 Justice Nelson's majority opinion
enunciated a new test for the enforceability of liquidated damages
clauses, although neither party had proposed or briefed a new
test. Henceforth, only unconscionable liquidated damages clauses
1 20
would be unenforceable.
To prove unconscionability, the party opposing a liquidated
damages clause must prove first that it signed a contract of adhesion with no meaningful opportunity to dicker over terms, and second, that the contract's terms were unfairly advantageous to the
drafter. 12 1 The court held that Klyap's employment contract was
indeed a contract of adhesion, but was not unfairly advantageous
to the school board. 12 2 Accordingly, the contract was not unconscionable, and the liquidated damages clause was enforceable
against Klyap. 12 3 The Montana Supreme Court, unlike the district court, did not consider whether the damages were difficult to
24
estimate or determine at the time the contract was formed.

prove. However, this section was adopted in 1895 from the Field Civil Code and consequently does not reflect the modern principle that parties in any type of situation can agree
to liquidated damages as a matter of freedom of contract." Id. See infra note 124.
118. Klyap, 5 n.2.
119. Id.
24 n.7; Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 46.
120. Klyap, 54.
121. Id.
48.
122. Id.
59-67.
123. Id.
72.
124. Chief Justice Gray's dissent argued that the majority opinion "leaves the liquidated
damages statute and . . . case law far behind, and creates an entirely new approach to
liquidated damages by incorporating... 'cases from other jurisdictions and academic writing on the subject'... [which is particularly inappropriate because neither] party argued or
briefed this approach .... ." Klyap, 11 80-81 (Gray, C.J., dissenting). Contra id.
24 n.7
(majority opinion) ("Because, as we discuss below, the instant case qualifies as a situation
where damages are impractical or extremely difficult to prove, we need not address this
potential problem with § 28-2-721."). The majority opinion claimed that the inquiry into
whether the clause was in the parties' "reasonable expectations" incorporated the difficultto-estimate question and therefore did not leave the statute far behind. Id.
23. Justice
Nelson repeated that claim in his special concurrence to his majority opinion. Id.
88
(Nelson, J., specially concurring).
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The Unconscionability Test

The new test in Klyap effectively nullified section 28-2-721,
eliminated the difficult-to-estimate requirement, and substantially altered the reasonableness requirement. While the statute
held liquidated damages clauses presumptively void and unenforceable unless "it would be impracticable or extremely difficult
to fix the actual damage,"1 125 the Klyap test holds liquidated damages clauses presumptively enforceable unless the clause is unconscionable. 1 2 6 The court lowered the Second Restatement's "reasonable" standard to merely "not unconscionable," a standard that
all contract terms must already meet under the doctrine of unconscionability.
The Klyap majority adopted the unconscionability test for liquidated damages in part on the basis of several law review articles. 12 7 In A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, Professor Larry Dimatteo argues that the
ancient ban on penalties should be loosened, and that efficient
contract penalties should be enforced. 128 Dimatteo defines efficient penalties as any and all that are not unconscionable. Under
Dimatteo's proposed liquidated damages rule, only inefficient penare banned. The doctrine of unconscionability already protects contracting parties against unconscionable liquidated damages clauses, so liquidated damages law becomes redundant.
The efficient penalty doctrine and the unconscionability test
revolutionize contract remedies jurisprudence. 1 2 9 Under Dimatteo's proposal, the separate law of liquidated damages disappears
(hence the subtitle: "Eliminatingthe Law of Liquidated Damages"). By adopting the unconscionability approach, the Montana
court breached the centuries-old wall of separation between damages and penalties in Anglo-American contract law, allowing
courts to enforce any penalty that is not unconscionable. 130
_l,.

125. MONT.CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005).
126. Klyap, 54.
127. Id.
23, 49.
128. Dimatteo, supra note 10, at 633.
129. Joseph Perillo calls Dimatteo's proposal a "sea change in approach" to liquidated
damages. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.1, at 396 n.2.
130. Scholars have advocated breaching the wall between damages and penalties, but
have been unsuccessful in changing the law (except perhaps in Montana). See supra note
53.
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C. Effects of Departingfrom the Language of the Statute
The court's unconscionability standard leaves the plain language of the statute far behind. 13 1 When courts "interpret" a statute contrary to its obvious meaning, any potential advantage of
codification disappears. Field and his codifying cohorts argued
that codification makes the law more accessible to lawyers and the
lay public alike by condensing the law into organized and easily
13 2
accessible volumes.
Liquidated damages, and the Klyap opinion in particular, illustrate how the Field Code makes the law inaccessible. Instead
of accessibility, the plain language of the statute now actively misleads a reader. A glance at the bold "liquidated damages" heading
of section 28-2-721 tells a reader that the statute governs liquidated damages clauses. Without delving into the case law, a
reader would not realize that the reasonableness of damages is a
critical element of an enforceable liquidated damages clause. Furthermore, a post-Klyap reader of the statute would never guess
that any "not unconscionable" liquidated damages clause is enforceable. Any reasonable reader would understand the code section to mean that liquidated damages clauses are presumptively
unenforceable unless the damages are "impracticable or extremely
difficult to determine." Reasonable readers are likely to misconstrue the nature of Montana's liquidated damages law by reading
the statute.
The rules governing liquidated damages parse damages from
penalties. Where the line is drawn between the two is governed
not only by a fixed conception of public policy, but also by notions
of commercial reasonableness. Thus liquidated damages - a
mandatory rule - is also influenced by common commercial practices as are default rules. Codifying a rule dependent on common
or commercial practices robs the rule of its most important quality: flexibility. 133 Like most default rules, the mandatory rule of
liquidated damages must be able to adapt to changing practice to
fulfill its function: drawing the appropriate line between damages
and penalties.
131. Klyap, 1880 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
132. Morriss et al., Debating the Field Civil Code, supra note 26, at 389.
133. See Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 44, 47; Morriss, "This
State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws," supra note 27, at 363-64; Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MoNT. L. REV. 17, 43-44 (1990) (discussing how statutes
from Montana's Field Civil Code affect property law, another area of law traditionally governed by the common law).
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Although Klyap apparently eliminated the legal effect of section 28-2-721, practitioners may be tempted to continue to cite to
the statute's language because it has not been repealed. In a common law jurisdiction, cases rendered invalid by a later case are
marked by warning symbols in legal databases such as Lexis and
Westlaw. The legal database services will not put a warning next
to a statute that a court ignores; practitioners must search out the
case law for clues that a state's high court ignores a particular
statute. The result is law that is less accessible.
The unconscionability test for liquidated damages is a significant innovation in contracts jurisprudence. This innovation occurred not in a state applying the common law, but in Montana,
where liquidated damages are governed by statute. Judging from
the results of its next significant liquidated damages case, the
court may have realized that Klyap went too far.
V.

MONTANA CASE LAW: COLE V. VALLEY ICE GARDEN,

A.

L.L.C. 134

Cole I

In 2005, when Klyap was less than two years old, the Montana Supreme Court again significantly changed the law of liquidated damages. Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, L.L.C. (Cole D
presented another post-Klyap opportunity for the court to consider
a liquidated damages clause. 13 5 The case concerned an employment contract in which David Cole agreed to coach the Bozeman
36
Ice Dogs hockey team for the team's owner (collectively VIG).'
The Montana Supreme Court decided Cole I on February 9, 2005,
mainly on the basis of a novel (and flawed) approach to the law of
liquidated damages.' 3 7 After rehearing the case several months
later, however, the court withdrew the February opinion and issued a new superseding opinion on May 5, 2005 (Cole II). Cole II
disposed of the case solely on the basis of the appellate standard of
review, without addressing the question of liquidated damages at
all.138
134. 2005 MT 21W, 2005 Mont. Lexis 24 (withdrawn).
135. Id. See Burnham, War Against Arbitration,supra note 14, at 149 n.37 (discussing
Cole 1). In between Klyap and Cole I, the court decided American Music Co. v. Higbee,
which cited Klyap and affirmed the unconscionability test, but remanded the question of
enforceability to the district court. American Music Co., 2004 MT 349, $ 23-26, 324 Mont.
23-26.
348, $ 23-26, 103 P.3d 518,
136. Cole I, $$ 12-14.
137. Id. $$ 34-37.
138. Cole 11, 2005 MT 115, I 2, 5, 327 Mont. 99, 1 2, 5, 113 P.3d 275, 1%2, 5.
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Why analyze a withdrawn opinion, the legal analog of a dead
letter? Three reasons. First, the dispositive issue of the superseding opinion was unrelated to the liquidated damages discussion in
the first opinion. The court did not specifically disown its Cole I
liquidated damages analysis. There is no reason to believe that
the court will not imitate the Cole I approach in the next liquidated damages case that arises. As of this writing, the withdrawn
opinion is also cited in the Lexis case notes for Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-721 and two other statutes for the court's
13 9
waiver application. The case has not yet entirely disappeared.
Second, the court's withdrawn opinion illustrates many of the
negative effects of Montana's statutory contract law. Third, the
withdrawn opinion included a significant unrecognized legal error: the court mistakenly characterized liquidated damages as a
default rule rather than a mandatory rule.
The disputed contract, drafted by Cole's attorney, required
that if Cole was terminated without cause, VIG must pay Cole one
year's salary ($50,000) as damages. If Cole was terminated for
good cause, no compensation was due. Under Cole's coaching, the
team's record worsened and game attendance decreased. When
the Ice Dogs lost six of the first seven games of the 1999-2000 season, Cole was fired about four months into a five year contract
term.

14 0

In his suit, Cole claimed that VIG breached the contract by
firing him without good cause. The trial court agreed and granted
summary judgment to Cole on the question of cause for termination. At a bench trial to determine damages, the district judge
held that the contract term fixing damages for termination without cause was void under section 28-2-721, Montana's liquidated
damages statute. Therefore, rather than the $50,000 that Cole
would have been due under the contract's liquidated damages
clause, the trial court determined that Cole's expectancy damages
totaled almost $200,000 for the remaining term of the employ14
ment contract. '
Cole I differs from most liquidated damages cases in that the
drafter, the party who was to receive the contract's liquidated
damages, argued against enforcement. In most liquidated damages cases, the party who will be paying the damage clause argues
against it.
139. See Lexis case notes for MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-204, 27-20-201, 28-2-72 (2005).
140. Cole I,
17-18.
141. Id.
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In its appeal, VIG claimed first that the termination was for
good cause, and second, that if termination was without good
cause, section 28-2-721 and Klyap set damages at the contract's
stipulated amount: one year's salary. In Cole I, a majority of the
Montana Supreme Court held that Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-721 (the statute with "liquidated damages" in the title)
did not apply to the liquidated damages clause in Cole's contract. 142

The Cole I opinion studiously avoided discussing Klyap, only
mentioning the case once:
VIG argues that... [under section 28-2-721], Cole must prove the
provision of the agreement unconscionable under our decision in Arrowhead Sch. Dist.No. 75 v. Klyap ....

VIG maintains that because

the clause was drafted by Cole - a fact not in dispute -

[Cole]

cannot prove the clause's143
unconscionability, and that, therefore, the
provision is enforceable.

The court's next question should have been: Is the liquidated damages clause enforceable? If the court had asked and answered
that question, then Klyap and its unconscionability test would
have been clearly reinforced, against the clear language of section
28-2-721. But the Cole I court sidestepped the critical questions
regarding the post-Klyap nature of section 28-2-721. The Montana Supreme Court never addressed the trial court's application
of the pre-Klyap plain meaning of the statute.
Instead, the court pulled a rabbit out of its hat. The rabbit
was one of the Field Civil Code's "maxims of jurisprudence," the
"hortatory bromides" 14 ensconced in Article 1 of the Montana
Code Annotated. The court applied Montana Code Annotated section 1-3-204 (2003), which reads:
Anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his

benefit. But a law established for
a public reason cannot be contra145
vened by a private agreement.

The court's novel application of the wavier maxim to liquidated
damages was sua sponte: "We conclude that because Cole waived
the benefit of the liquidated damages law by virtue of the contract
provisions he drafted, the District Court erred in applying the pro142. Id. $ 34, 37.
143. Id.
32.

144. Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 32. The Field Civil Code
also instructs readers how the maxims of jurisprudence should be used: "Purpose of maxims. The maxims of jurisprudence ... are intended not to qualify any of the other provisions of this code but to aid in their just application." MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-101 (2005).
145. See Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 50-52 (criticizing the
Montana Supreme Court's application of MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-204 (2005)).
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visions of the liquidated damages statute to the contract before
us."

14 6

Professor Scott Burnham described section 1-3-204 and other
maxims as generally harmless "pithy sayings[,] .. .but when reduced to black letter law they can cause great mischief."147 In this
case the mischief is compound. The court's application of the
waiver maxim was premised on the legal error that the rule governing liquidated damages is a default rule, and the maxim's application also violated a principle of statutory application.
B.

Rules of Statutory Application

The court ignored the principle of statutory interpretation codified in Montana, naturally - that multiple relevant statutes
be applied from most specific to most general. Montana Code Annotated section 1-2-102 (2005) provides:
When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter
is paramount to the former, so a particular
intent will control a gen14 8
eral one that is inconsistent with it.

Under that directive, the court should have considered whether
the parties waived the statute only after deciding whether the
clause was enforceable under the liquidated damages statute. Application of the waiver maxim would have been unnecessary if the
liquidated damages statute allowed the disputed clause to be enforced.
The Cole I majority opinion dispensed with the specifically
relevant law of liquidated damages in far fewer words than it expended on the generalized waiver maxim. (The Klyap court
wasted even fewer words on the statute, quoting it only in one
footnote,1 4 9 and discussing it in another footnote.150) The court
held that, because Cole bargained for the term and drafted it, the
parties waived the statute. Therefore, the clause was enforceable,
and Cole should receive the contract's liquidated damages of
$50,000, rather than the nearly $200,000 trial court award.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Cole I, 34.
Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 32.
Id. at 34 (discussing MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-102 (2005)).
Klyap, 24 n.6.
Id.
24 n.7.
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Of Default Rules and Mandatory Rules

The court's second legal error was more serious. In order for
any party to "waive the benefit of a law," the law waived must be a
default rule rather than a mandatory rule. Mandatory rules may
not be waived by contract. 15 1 As discussed above in Section II. C,
the law of liquidated damages is a mandatory rule. The court's
1 52
waiver application and holding was therefore erroneous.
The court set up the waiver with the following circular argument, concluding that the liquidated damages statute constitutes
a default rule:
[The liquidated damages statute] applies in general to contracts entered into between bargaining parties .... Moreover, the existence

of § 28-2-721(2), in the statutory scheme supports the proposition
that it is a law whose provisions are intended for the benefit of and therefore may be waived by - contracting parties. In other
words, the fact that § 28-2-721(2) allows by its provisions the waiver
of the benefit of the statute, demonstrates that it is not a law established for a public reason,
because such laws cannot be contravened
15 3
by private agreement.

The court implied that because the statute generally forbids liquidated damages clauses but under some conditions allows them,
the rule must be default. The court offered this incorrect assertion
without analysis or citation, based only on the "existence of § 28-2721 (2) in the statutory scheme." The entire liquidated damages
holding rests on this language.
In fact, the faulty assertion implodes the entire waiver analysis. Many mandatory rules allow exceptions under which the rule
will not apply. Returning to the statute of frauds analogy, an oral
contract for the purchase of land may be enforceable, for example,
if the party seeking enforcement proves that she acted to her detriment in reasonable reliance on the other party's assurances, and
injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the contract by specific
performance. 154 The existence of an exception does not convert
the statute of frauds into a default rule. Rather the rule sets lim151. Cole 1, 37-39.
152. In the court's defense, Professor Burnham, Montana's preeminent resident contracts scholar, also failed to recognize that the liquidated damages statute enunciates a
mandatory rule: "The [Cole I ] court correctly determined that section 28-2-721 is not the
kind of regulatory [or mandatory] rule that parties cannot waive. . . .This statute is
facilitatory [or a default rule]." Burnham, War Against Arbitration, supra note 14, at 149
n.37 (discussing Cole I).
153. Cole I, 36.
154. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 (1981).
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its within which the parties may freely agree. The limits themselves however, are mandatory.
The default rule measures contract damages by the amount of
the non-breaching party's expectancy interest, determined after
breach. 155 By including a liquidated damages clause, contracting
parties contract around the default rule of expectancy. 156 The law
of liquidated damages erects the mandatory upper boundary that
limits the parties' freedom to contract around the default rule. If
the parties' liquidated damages clause extends beyond that
boundary, then the damages will be considered an unenforceable
penalty, and the clause will be excised from the contract. 5 7 Because the rules governing liquidated damages draw the line between damages and penalties, the rules are mandatory. 5 8 The
court's application of the waiver maxim to liquidated damages
rests on a flawed premise.
D. Operation of the Waiver Maxim
The court's application of the waiver maxim to section 28-2721 pushes most liquidated damages clauses outside the reach of
the liquidated damages statute. By the court's analysis, the
drafter and non-drafter of any bargained-for liquidated damages
clause both waive the benefit of the liquidated damages law. In
an adhesion contract, however, the non-drafting party by defini15 9
tion had no meaningful opportunity to dicker over terms.
Therefore, only the non-drafting party to an adhesion contract
would be able to defeat the waiver and invoke the liquidated damages statute under the court's analysis.
A party thus eluding the waiver maxim may invoke the statute, and must prove unconscionability based on Klyap. The unconscionability test requires that the non-drafter prove: (1) that it
had no meaningful ability to bargain for the terms; and (2) that
the terms were unfairly favorable to the drafter. 160 Of course, the
155. Id. § 347; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-202, -303 (2005); Scott & Triantis, supra note
47, at 1434; Scott J. Burnham, Contract Damages in Montana PartI: Expectancy Damages,
44 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
156. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18, at 304 ("[A liquidated damages provision]
displaces the conventional damage remedy for breach.").
157. 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 41, § 58.4, at 413.
158. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 72, at 616 (characterizing as a mandatory rule
liquidated damages' function to separate penalty from damages).
159. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6,

160. Klyap, 2003 MT 294,

§

4.26, at 557.

48, 318 Mont. 103,

48, 79 P.3d 250,
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non-drafting party already proved the first of those two steps to
show it did not waive the statute.
The Cole I waiver analysis simply took the first step of the
Klyap test and renamed it waiver. If the court was satisfied with
Klyap, why create an entirely novel means of addressing liquidated damages simply to come to the same result? The court may
have been uncomfortable with its recent precedent but was not
prepared to disown it. Klyap will be a difficult case to overrule.
Klyap essentially overruled all previous liquidated damages case
law. If the overruling case is itself overruled, will the now-undead
statutes rise from their graves like the zombies in The Night of
the Living Dead to wreak havoc upon the living? 16 1 The Cole I
waiver analysis allows a court to resolve most liquidated damages
cases without applying the problematic statute. As long as the
parties bargained, then Klyap and section 28-2-721 do not apply.
Thus Klyap becomes less important. Using the Cole I model, a
court can waive first and ask questions later or not at all.
E.

Cole II: The Superseding Opinion

Cole I was good law for only about three months. Upon VIG's
motion for rehearing, the Cole i majority apparently realized what
Justice Rice had already pointed out in the Cole I dissent: the
wrong standard of review had been applied to the question of
cause. The court withdrew Cole I, and unanimously decided Cole
11.162

In the second opinion, the court held that the Ice Dogs' losing
record was actually good cause for VIG to fire Cole. 163 No damages were due, liquidated or otherwise. Because this approach bypassed all damages analysis, the liquidated damages discussion
disappeared. The court's novel application of the maxim of jurisprudence disappeared. The court's erroneous holding that liquidated damages constitute a default rule disappeared. Everything
that made Cole I noteworthy to an observer of contract law officially disappeared.

161.

NIGHT OF THE LING DEAD

162. Cole 11, 2005 MT 115,
163. Id. T 1.

(Image Ten Productions 1968).

2, 327 Mont. 99,
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LESSONS FROM THE CASE LAW

The Field Civil Code Distorts Montana's Contract Law

Decius Wade, widely respected former Montana Territorial
Supreme Court Justice, argued forcefully in the 1890s that Montana should adopt Field's Civil Code. In a speech extolling the virtues of codification, Wade proclaimed that "[c]odification ... was
never intended to change the law, its only purpose being to hunt
up, gather together and put in form that which the courts have
16 4
declared to be the law."
Wade's prediction that the codes would not change substantive Montana law proved incorrect.165 Codification in itself
changes the law. In the case of liquidated damages, the process of
codification caused the less important, difficult-to-estimate prong
of the test to subsume the more important reasonableness prong.
Codification also destroys the common law's greatest asset: its
flexibility. Statutory contract rules, even when they accurately
mimic an analogous common law rule, lack the ability to evolve
alongside commercial practice. Most contract rules are meant to
166
facilitate rather than regulate parties' actions.
Montana's liquidated damages jurisprudence illustrates that
mandatory rules also may require the flexibility that is the hallmark of the common law. Mandatory rules that go to enforceability - rather than to the ability to enter contracts - may have a
commercial-reasonableness component as well as a public policy
component. Therefore, these rules may also need to adjust to
changing commercial practice. Justice Nelson's Klyap opinion describes how commercial practice has changed in the area of liquidated damages: "section [28-2-721] was adopted in 1895 from the
Field Civil Code and consequently does not reflect the modem
principle that parties in any type of situation can agree to liqui16 7
dated damages as a matter of freedom of contract."
Professor Burnham argues that the Montana Legislature
should repeal Montana's Field Code statutes, except those that
are mandatory and those that diverge from the common law
164. Andrew P. Morriss, Decius S. Wade's Necessity for Codification, 61 MoNT. L. REV.
407, 412-13 (2000).
165. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws," supra note 27, at 397-402.
166. Professor Burnham argues that statutory contract rules cause great mischief when
used to govern default rules. Burnham, War Against Arbitration, supra note 14, at 146.
167. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 24 n.7, 318 Mont. 103,
24 n.7, 79 P.3d 250,
24 n.7.
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rule. 168 The Montana liquidated damages statute is both
mandatory and diverges from the common law. Applying Burnham's criteria, one might be tempted to spare section 28-2-721
from repeal. However, this particular Field Code statute has created as much of a legal mess as any Field Civil Code default rule.
Burnham's formula for repeal was overly restrictive: statutes that
diverge from the common law rule may be particularly eligible for
repeal because they tend not to follow modern commercial practices. That is particularly true in statutes governing enforceability. Contract statutes that diverge from the common law rule tend
to be those that also diverge from common practice and acceptance
in other common law ju sdictions.
B.

What Montana PractitionersShould Heed from the Montana
Supreme Court's Treatment of Liquidated
Damages Clauses

Practitioners should probably not rely on Klyap to draft enforceable liquidated damages clauses. Although Westlaw and
Lexis indicate no negative treatment, Klyap may not be solid precedent. 16 9 In Cole I, even though the defendant's briefs cited
70
Klyap as controlling authority over liquidated damages clauses,
the court refused to discuss the case, its most directly on-point
precedent.' 7 1 The Cole I court's reluctance to cite Klyap may signal the court's discomfort with the unconscionability standard, especially because Klyap would have led to the very same result the
Cole I court came to. For contract drafters, the "reasonableness"
standard of the common law rule is probably safer than Klyap's
17 2
unconscionability standard.
The difficult-to-estimate element of the statute's plain language shows little signs of life. Although Klyap may not be relia168. Burnham, Let's Repeal the Field Code!, supra note 5, at 63. Burnham criticizes the
Field Code at every opportunity. See Morriss et al., Debating the Field Civil Code, supra
note 26 (arguing the Field Civil Codes' negative effects in a debate with Montana Supreme
Court Justice James Nelson); Burnham, War Against Arbitration, supra note 14, at 146
n.25 ("I will again say to the Legislature: Repeal the damn thing."); Burnham, Let's Repeal
the Field Code!, supra note 5 (the exclamatory title says it all).
169. See Klyap entries on Westlaw and Lexis database services.
170. Cole I, T 32.
171. Id.
172. Practitioners should note once again that goods contracts are governed by a separate statute in Montana's version of the UCC: Montana Code Annotated section 30-2-718
(2005). That statute is untested by the Montana Supreme Court as of this writing; it is not
clear whether Klyap's unconscionability test was intended to cover goods contracts.
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ble precedent, the plain language of the statute may not be either.
The pre-2003 cases interpreting the statute according to its plain
meaning - requiring that damages be difficult to estimate - were
overruled by Klyap. The Montana Supreme Court may be more
likely to enforce liquidated damages clauses than the plain language of section 28-2-721 indicates, even if Klyap is not solid precedent.
Cole I and Klyap indicate that the court would prefer a rule of
liquidated damages closer to the common law rule. The court
found two separate methods of enforcing liquidated damages
clauses despite the statute. The first method, used by Klyap's majority, effectively overruled the statute. The second method, used
by the Cole I majority, employed the waiver maxim to bypass the
statute. Both methods are flawed. Cole I suggests that the court
may prefer an approach that sidelines the statute without entirely
disregarding it, as the Klyap test did.
Using Cole I as a template, the court may apply the waiver
maxim the next time it considers a liquidated damages clause.
However, the waiver analyis rests on the false premise that the
law of liquidated damages is a default rule. Rather, liquidated
damages law sets the mandatory boundaries within which parties
are free to contract.
The court's analyses in Klyap and Cole I indicate that the
court will hold liquidated damages clauses to a higher standard
when the stronger party seeks to enforce the clause against a
weaker party in a contract of adhesion. In such a case, the court
may return to the plain language of section 28-2-721, requiring
the stronger party to prove that the damages were "impracticable
or extremely difficult to determine" before holding a liquidated
17 3
damages clause enforceable.
The court bent over backwards to move Montana law closer to
the current common law rule of liquidated damages. First, the
Klyap majority openly rejected the plain meaning of the statute
and developed a revolutionary new test. Second, the Cole I majority undertook a fundamentally flawed analysis in order to enforce
a liquidated damages clause without invoking Klyap. These actions indicate that the court wants to bring Montana's law of liqui173. The California Legislature amended its liquidated damages statute (formerly identical to Montana's) so that liquidated damages clauses are presumptively enforceable in
contracts between commercial entities, but presumptively unenforceable in consumer contracts and residential leases. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (2006); Burnham, Let's Repeal the
Field Code!, supra note 5, at 46-47.
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dated damages in line with most other jurisdictions. The modern
commercial norm in most jurisdictions presumes greater enforcement of liquidated damages clauses.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Contract law functions to facilitate commerce and to promote
certain public policies. Default rules are built upon generally accepted commercial practice and the standards of commercial reasonableness. 174 Some mandatory rules are based upon a public
policy component as well as on the standards of commercial practice and reasonableness. Because commercial practice frequently
changes in response to new markets, technologies, and practices,
contract law should evolve in order to continue to facilitate commerce.
If contract rules are locked in nineteenth century statutes
while commercial practices evolve, statutory contract law may
eventually obstruct rather than facilitate commerce. At that
point, courts can either enforce a result unreasonable in the circumstances or try to jury-rig an argument with whatever legal
material is at hand to reach the reasonable result.
Faced with a Field Civil Code statute that the Montana Legislature has no0t amended since its enactment in 1895, a statute out

of step with current commercial practices and conflicting with
most jurisdictions' treatment of liquidated damages, the Klyap
and Cole I courts bypassed the statute. The Klyap court brazenly
disregarded the statute, while the Cole I court, ignoring Klyap,
resurrected some unknown version of the statute only long enough
to render it irrelevant in many situations by applying a maxim of
jurisprudence.
Montana courts have now attempted two jury-rigged solutions to circumvent the outmoded liquidated damages statute.
Both solutions are based on flawed analyses and make dangerous
precedent. At this stage, the Montana Legislature is in a much
better position to mop up the spilled liquidated damages law than
are the courts.

174. Burnham, War Against Arbitration, supra note 14, at 139.
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